2) If universal healthcare is implemented, then it is still possible to utilize competitive bidding to help with the process. It would actually become much more important and possible the more the government is actually involved in the provision of healthcare. To the extent the government is responsible for providing healthcare in a direct way, the government would then be a massive consumer of medically related goods. This would give the government a huge amount of leverage when it came to negotiations with various vendors. This means that vendors would need the government more than the government would need any individual vendor. By going with competitive bidding in the same way, a universal healthcare regime would be able to keep the costs of providing healthcare down. This is a good thing, especially because the government would be on the hook for providing healthcare even if the tax receipts happened to go down in a given year. Likewise, because vendors know that the government has to provide healthcare regardless of what happens, they could take advantage of the government on pricing. Competitive bidding would help to ensure that these prices stay low despite the fact that the US government has to provide healthcare. It is a means of shifting the burden from one side to the other.
Under the Affordable Care Act, there are still going to be Medicare and Medicaid payments made by the government. These things still exist in large form and still constitute a major player in the health provision market. Because these forces still exist, it is still critical to find ways to keep the costs of doing business low. Competitive bidding still provides an excellent way to keep down the costs, even after the passage of this law which also provides other ways to keep costs down.
Schatz, D., & Cefalu, W. T. (2016). Reevaluation of CMS’Competitive Bidding Program. Diabetes Care, 39(7), 1078-1079.
Song, Z., Landrum, M. B., & Chernew, M. E. (2013). Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: Effect of benchmark changes on plan bids. Journal of health economics, 32(6), 1301-1312.